[0day-rubbish] Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 Unauthenticated JMX jvmtiAgentLoad native code execution (8.1)

[disclosure via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure () seclists org>]

0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in
Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 build 3506 (with JMS Extender 2.1.0).

Type: unauthenticated JMX inspection console allowing an anonymous caller to
invoke any MBean operation, reaching jvmtiAgentLoad on
com.sun.management:type=DiagnosticCommand to load and run a native agent
library inside the broker JVM (CWE-306, CWE-345, CWE-20, CWE-250, CWE-1188)

Scoring. This finding is dual-scored on one documented delivery precondition,
and both figures are published rather than a single headline number:
- PRIMARY, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This is the
  conservative figure for an attacker with network access only: the agent
  library must be delivered to a filesystem path by means outside this endpoint.
- CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This
  is the shipped-default exposure where the precondition is ALREADY satisfied,
  that is a native shared object is already reachable at a filesystem path the
  attacker names. Exploitation is then one deterministic HTTP request. The 9.8
  figure is conditional, not the primary rating, and is not the headline.

Impact: native code execution inside the Lightstreamer JVM as the service
process, inheriting that process's full identity. In the verified deployment the
process ran as uid=0(root), so the executed commands ran as root; root is not
claimed to be a factory-mandated identity, it is whatever account launched the
service. The shipping configuration sets <jmxtree_enabled>Y</jmxtree_enabled>
and <dashboard><public>Y</public> even though the adjacent comments claim the
default is N, and the only remaining check is a Referer header matching the
target host, which any HTTP client forges.

Authentication: unauthenticated (no credential of any kind).

Verification boundary, stated plainly. We verified the MBean-invocation and
native-code-execution legs against a research-host deployment reached over
loopback (HTTP 200 with "return code: 0", marker files recording uid=0(root),
and id/whoami commands chosen by the HTTP client at send time). The native
agent library, however, was already present on disk, placed beforehand over an
authenticated root session. jvmtiAgentLoad takes a filesystem path and fetches
nothing (http:// and file:// were both treated as literal strings), so the
fully remote chain including payload delivery is NOT demonstrated by this
advisory; what is proven unauthenticated is the request leg, not the delivery
leg.

Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lightstreamer-unauth-jmx-jvmti-agentload-rce

Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish

The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to
this finding yet.

--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
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